12/11/2022 0 Comments The challenger sale filetype pdf![]() Bijdragen Tot De Taal-, Land- En Volkenkunde, 171(2/3), 165–195.Īspinall, E., & Rohman, N. The patronage patchwork: Village brokerage networks and the power of the state in an Indonesian election. Election Law Journal: Rules, Politics, and Policy, 1(3), 315–338.Īspinall, E., & As'ad, M.U. ![]() elections: An analysis of state and federal offices, 1942–2000. This is further supported by the ability of a challenger and his socio-political network to exploit the weaknesses of the incumbent.Īnsolabehere, S., & Snyder, J. This article shows that local village contexts, as well as reliance on social bonds, enable challengers to avoid the transactionalism and clientelism that have long characterised political machines. The author shows that several factors, including elite fragmentation, candidate recruitment, socio-political networks, and the existence of a shared enemy effectively nullify the buying of political services and the use of clientelistic strategies. Using a qualitative approach to examine the 2018 village chief election in Ngestiharjo, Yogyakarta, this article explains how electoral challengers can use political machines without buying political services, as well as the reason such challengers and their machines decide not to employ clientelism in their search for electoral victory. However, in several cases candidates have created political machines without buying political services or employing clientelistic strategies. Political machines are widely evident in Indonesian elections, particularly in the sale of political services and use of clientelistic strategies.
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